Their rationale is highly suspicious- the problems that lead to them being able to execute code in Windows are fundamental security problems with desktop computers and something that needs to be fixed at a basic architectural level. Their "rootkit" loads off of removable media during the computer's boot process, prior to an OS on disk loading. How exactly do they propose a swift solution to the two truths- if the attacker has direct physical access to the computer you have lost, and if integrity is compromised prior to your code running, your code is compromised?

The only technical solution would be additional controls during the boot sequence, but this is a problem that people have been working on for decades without much progress (the best we have is password protected BIOS, TPM, and Encryption- none of which really help against this attack). The problem ultimately is that they are looking for technical controls to prevent physical tampering (since that is the attack vector for their boot attack), when physical controls are the best prevention for physical tampering.

Boot set to hard disk first, a password protected bios, and a tamper proof case that prevents the CMOS battery from being pulled would thwart 90% of attempts to execute this attack. The key is a tamper proof case- a physical control for a physical problem.